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Article 5

NOTES
Mr. Smith, who has been one of the leaders in the drive to suppress
crime in the City of Chicago, gave a graphic description of the alliance
between crime and politics and the-difficulties of rooting out a criminal
element which has engrafted itself into every branch of government.
He pointed out that as long as criminals can dominate elections a
democratic form of government will be doomed to fail in fighting
crime. Mr. Smith added that conditions are such that only the Federal government acting under the powers given to the president by the
Constitution can effectively "clean up" our larger cities.
Professor Wilson gave a short account of the results achieved to
date by the use of the "lie detector." The different reactions of the
pulse, respiration, and blood pressure caused by the mental realization
that one is telling a lie were described by the speaker. To demonstrate how the "lie detector" could, by recording these reactions, show
whether or not the person subjected to the test was telling the truth,
Prof. Wilson had Joseph Laughlin, president of the Club, go through a
sample test. The success of the test convinced many that the results
of these tests should be admissible in evidence.
The Hon. Henry T. Rainey, Speaker of the House of Representatives, was introduced to the members of the Club by Dean Thomas F.
Konop at a meeting held in the law library on the morning of October
17. Speaker Rainey visited the College of Law upon the invitation of
Dean Konop, who served in Congress with Mr. Rainey from 1911 to
1917. After addressing a few remarks to the students and faculty, the
Speaker was presented with a cane, traditional accoutrement of a
senior in the College of Law, by Joseph A. Laughlin, president of the
Club.

NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS OF LAw-REGULATION OF
TRADE op BusINEss IN GENERAL.-In the case of People v. Nebbid I

the defendant was convicted in the lower court of violating a statute
recently passed by the Legislature of New York fixing a minimum
price for the sale of milk. The statute declared that because of the
extremely low price at which milk was selling a temporary emergency
existed, and the milk industry was made a business affecting the public
health and interest until March 31, 1934. A Milk Control Board, composed of three members, was created to fix the minimum price at which
milk could be sold. A sale at a price lower than that fixed by the
Board was made a crime. The defendant admittedly sold milk at a
1 186 N. E. 694 (N. Y. 1933).
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price lower than the Board fixed as a minimum. He appealed from
the conviction in the lower court on the ground that the statute was
unconstitutional as a violation of the provision that no person shall
be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. The New York Court of Appeals held the statute was valid as
a reasonable exercise of the police power.
Under the Merchantile theory of government, prevalent in Europe
up to about the middle of the eighteenth century, it was not uncommon to regulate prices of merchandise by legislation. This was also
done in America to some extent in Colonial days, but the practice was
never general in this country. With the adoption of the Laissez Faire
theory of individualism, the regulation of prices in industry was left
to the individual. The constitutions of the several states and of the
United States provided that no person was to be deprived of his life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. The liberty of making
contracts is generally recognized as property; 2 so also is the right to
carry on a lawful business.3 However, these rights are not absolute;
they are subject to a reasonable exercise of the police power by the
Government. Under the exercise of the police power it has been recognized that the State has the right to regulate prices in certain cases
and in certain types of industries. A business quasi public in nature
or affected with a public interest is one of these types.
In Munn v. Illinois,4 one of the early and leading cases on the matter, the United States Supreme Court held that a statute passed by
the Illinois Legislature fixing the maximum prices that could be charged
for the storage of grain in elevators at Chicago and other places in the
state was not unconstitutional under the "due process" clause in the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. The point
was stressed in this case that the elevators being regulated exercised
a virtual monopoly in the business. The court based its decision on
the theory that when the owner of property devotes it to a use in
which the public has an interest, he in effect grants to the public an
interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public
for the common good to the extent of the interest he has thus created.
In German Alliance Insurance Company v. Lewis 5 the fixing of
maximum and minimum charges for fire insurance was held constitutional in the absence of a monopoly in the business being regulated.
The court further held in that case that a business may be so far
affected with a public interest as to permit legislative regulation of its
rates and charges although no public trust is imposed upon the prop2

Mathews v. People, 67 N. E. 28 (Il. 1903).

3

Gray v. Building Trades Council, 97 N. W. 663 (Minn. 1903).
94 U. S. 113 (1876).
233 U. S. 389 (1914).
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NOTES
erty, and although the public may not have a, legal right to demand
and receive service.
In Block v. Hirsh I a temporary regulation of the rents of houses
was held to be a valid exercise of the police power because of the
temporary emergency caused by the World War. The statute in question gave a tenant the privilege of holding over after the expiration
of the lease, subject to regulation by the commission appointed by that
act, so long as he paid the rent and performed the conditions as fixed
by the lease or as modified by the commission. The court declared
that circumstances may so change in time or so differ in space as to
clothe with a public interest so great as to justify regulation by law
an interest which at other times or in other places would be a matter
of purely private concern.
From these cases it is clear that the United States Supreme Court
nas tended to increase rather than decrease the scope and application
of the police power with regard to the regulation of prices. Yet it is
to be noted that in all of the cases, except the Insurance Company
case,7 the regulation being considered was a fixing of a maximum
rather than a minimum price; and without exception, the purpose of
the regulation was to protect the consumer. In the New York case
under consideration, however, the regulation fixed a minimum price
primarily for the protection of the producer of milk. Yet under modem
society the relation between one class of people and the others is so
intricate that the prosperity of the whole depends upon the prosperity
of each one. It is impossible for one class to enjoy prosperity while
another class suffers in depression.
It seems, therefore, that the New York court was entirely justified
in holding that the regulation was for the benefit of the people as a
whole, and was a valid exercise of the police power. Of course, there
will always be those who will say that the fixing of a minimum price
for milk is an unwarranted application of the principle that the State
has the right to regulate prices of a business affected with a public
interest. They may be answered in the words of Mr. Justice McKenna: 8 "It would be a bold thing to say the prindiple is fixed,
inelastic, in the precedents of the past, and cannot be applied though
modern economic conditions may make necessary or beneficial its
application." 9
John A. Berry.
256 U. S. 135 (1921).
Op. cit. supra note 5.
German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, op. cit. supra note 5.
9 For further reference on the Regulation of Prices, see Cooley on Constitutional Law, p. 305; Black's Constitutional Law, p. 412; Constitutional Law, 6 R.
C. L. 224.
0
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FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCEs-HUSBAND AND WIFE.-As the juggernaut of economic depression pursues its relentless leveling course, the

laws pertinent to the relation of debtor and creditor 'become increasingly important, and their application becomes a matter of national
debate. The debtor seeks legal ways to protect what property he has
from the machinery set up to enforce the payment of debts. The
creditor, faced with the possibility of having to write off certain debts
as total losses, looks to the law to preclude this event.
The device most commonly used among small debtors is the transfer
of a husband's property to his wife. There seems to be a quite widespread delusion that this scheme is impregnable, certain to baffle
creditors. The creditor knows that, generally speaking, his wife's property cannot be taken to pay his debts. He knows, too, that in effect
he will still have control of the property, and that upon his death it
will be available to his dependents. The transfer is often effected
while the husband is perfectly solvent, his caution warning him to
provide for future contingencies. As a result the practice of putting
the title to all property in the wife's name is a common one in the
United States. A review of the laws concerning the effect of a property
transfer from husband to wife as affecting the rights of the husband's
creditors is, therefore, apropos at this time. For the sake of clearness
the subject is best divided into a consideration of contracts and gifts.
Under the common law a husband and wife could not contract with
each other because for all legal purposes they were considered as an
entity, and the wife was considered as being without contractual volition.' In equity such contracts would, in many instances, be enforced, though unenforceable at law; but under the general doctrines
of equity no contract would be recognized which was unfair or detrimental to the interests of third persons. 2 Thus, the validity of a contract 'between a husband and wife is now to be determined from the
statutes and the interpretations thereof in each particular state. The
interpretation of statutes conferring upon women general contractual
capacity is important. While the majority of the courts hold that such
general statutes destroy the common law unity upon which the incapacity was based and, therefore, permit a husband and wife to contract with each other,3 yet a few states hold that such statutes being
in derogation of the common law should be construed as giving only
30 C. J. 669, Husband and Wife, § 248, Notes 75, 77.
In re Hoffman, 199 Fed. 448 (1912); Leach v. Rains, 149 Ind. 152 (1897).
3 North v. North, 166 I1. 179, 46 N. E. 729 (1897); Townsend v. Huntzinger,
41 Ind. App. 223, 83 N. E. 619 (1908).
1
2

For a typical statute, see Compiled Laws of Michigan (1929) § 13057. Cases
interpreting this statute: Randall v. Randall, 37 Mich. 563 (1877); Ransom v.
Ransom, 30 Mich. 328 (1874).

NOTES
such powers as are specifically named and4 thus deny a married woman
the power to contract with her husband.
Like all contracts, a contract between husband and, wife must he
supported by a good consideration, and this is especially true when
5
such contracts are being attacked by creditors of the husband. A
conveyance for an adequate consideration with no intent on the part
of the grantee to defraud the creditors of the grantor will be upheld
against the creditors. 6 The question of what will constitute an adequate consideration is thus presented. All the devices which have been
used at one time or another cannot be mentioned, but the more important can be indicated.
(1) Natural love and affection is not a good consideration. The
conveyance is only voluntary and is void as to creditors. In Dirks
v. Union Savings Association,8 McCoy, J., said: "As between husband
and wife a voluntary transfer of property by gift in consideration of
love and affection only is a good consideration as between them, but
it is not a sufficient consideration as against creditors of the donor.
It is a fraud though the parties had no present intent to commit a
fraud. In the eye of the law everyone is presumed to intend the natural
consequences of his acts."
(2) The release of a wife's inchoate right of dower will constitute a
valuable consideration for a reasonable 9 conveyance of property by a
husband to his wife. 10
(3) In many instances the services of the wife are recited as the
consideration for the conveyance. At common law the husband was
entitled to the services and earnings of his wife and he could not by
giving them to her, or investing them, or by permitting her to invest
them in property in her own name withdraw them or the property
from the claims of his existing creditors.1 In most jurisdictions, how4

Crosby v. Clem, 209 Mass. 193, 95 N. E. 297 (1911).

5

Hinkle v. Downing, 116 Iowa 693, 88 N. W. 1088 (1902); Fox v. Peck, 151

Ill. 226, 37 N. E. 873 (1892).
6 Bondle v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 174 Pac. 44 (Cal. 1918); Seavey v.
Seavey, 114 Me. 14, 95 At. 265 (1915); Frank v. Von Boyer, 236 N. Y. 473,
141 N. E. 920 (1923).
7 Farrand v. Caton, 69 Mich. 235, 37 N. W. 199 (1888).
In Arbough v. Alexander, 164 Ia. 635, 146 N. W. 747 (1914), the court, while
holding that love and affection was sufficient consideration for a deed from a
husband to his wife, specifically pointed out that the plantiff was not a creditor
who could object to the conveyance.
8 40 S. D. 529, 168 N. W. 578 (1918). See also Kelly v. Stubblefield, 26 S. W.
(2d) 28 (Tex. 1930).
9 Huwe v. Knecht, 10 Ohio App. 487 (1919).
10 Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances, 578; Citizen's Bank v. Bolen, 121 Ind.
301, 23 N. E. 146 (1889).

11 Union Trust Co. v. Fisher, 25 Fed. 178 (1885); Bowman v. Ash, 143 111.*
649, 32 N. E. 486 (1891). See also, Fraudulent Conveyances, 27 C. J. 422, § 28.
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ever, in conformity with the general lessening of the strict provisions
of the common law relative to coverture, the rule has been relaxed and
a woman is allowed to retain earnings acquired in the conduct of 1a2
separate business with the express or implied consent of her husband.
Since money earned in this way belongs to the wife it may be used
as consideration for a conveyance. 1 3 It is to be noted, however, that
neither the performance of ordinary household duties, 14 nor the assistance given to a husband in carrying on his business, 15 is a valid consideration for a conveyance. Fead, J., in Detroit Security Trust Co. v.
Gitre,16 said: "The statute does not convert the marital relationship
into a business partnership nor raise a money debt from husband to
wife for her services to him, even though they take her outside the
strict ambit of the domestic circle and consist of aid to him in his
business."
(4) Whether or not the savings of a wife from money given to her
by her husband for personal or household expenses constitute a sufficient consideration for a conveyance is a moot question. Naturally,
the different circumstances of the cases, the amount of the fund, the
efforts of the wife, the abscence of a fraudulent design, account for the
17
contrariety of opinion.
When the consideration for the contract is monetary its adequacy
is to be determined by the financial condition of the husband at the
time of the conveyance and the good faith of the wife.' 8
The simplest contract transaction for a debtor-husband to devise
would consist of a gift of money to his wife and the subsequent use of
the money by the wife as consideration for a contract. Naturally, this
gift would first have to be valid before it could be used by the wife
as a consideration. If the gift is not valid, the money is still the husband's, and the property in the wife's name which represents the gift
may be reached by the husband's creditors.
12

Boots v. Griffith, 89 Ind. 246 (1883); King v. Wells, 106 Iowa 649, 77

N. W. 338 (1898).
13

Draper v. Buggee, 133 Mass. 258 (1881); Gilbert v. Glenny, 75 Iowa 513,

39 N. W. 818 (1888).

14

Coleman v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17, 45 Am. Rep. 160 (1883); Quidont v.

Perteaq, 18 N. J. Eq. 472 (1867). As to keeping boarders see, Gilbert v. Glenny,
op. cit. supra note 13.
15 Henze v. Rogatzky, 165 N. W. 629 (1917); Detroit Security Trust Co.
v. Gitre, 254 Mich. 66, 235 N. W. 884 (1931).

16

Op. cit. supra note 15.

17 Held a good consideration in Smith v. Reber, 18 Atl. 462 (N. J. Ch.
1889). As to property purchased by the wife with savings see, Ford Lumber and
Mfg. Co. v. Cord, 150 Ky. 738, 150 S. W. 991 (1912); Milkman v. Arthe, 221 Fed.
134 (1914).
18 Schwenck v. Hess, 99 S. E. 255 (W. Va. 1919); American Trust Co. v.

Kaufman, 119 Atl. 747 (Penn. 1923).

NOTES

A gift by a husband to his wife is, as a general rule, valid against
subsequent creditors but not against those subsequent creditors to
whom the donor contemplates becoming indebted when he makes the
20
gift.19 The difficulty of proving this last proposition is apparent.
The wife's knowledge of the husband's fraudulent intent, is unimportant, if the husband be insolvent. 21 The creditor-husband's intent is
22
the material point to consider.
A husband may make a valid gift to his wife as long as he retains
property amply sufficient to pay his debts. 23 This rule is much more
equitable than the view once propounded by Chancellor Kent (and
still held by some courts), namely, that if the party be indebted at all
at the time of the gift the conveyance is conclusively fraudulent as to
existing creditors.2 4 A man's moral obligalion to provide for his wife
and children is a natural consideration for the conveyance and there
can be no presumption of fraud if the donor remains solvent. A decision which makes any gift to a wife or family subject to attack by
creditors if at the time of the gift the donor was a debtor exhalts
the rights of a creditor at the expense of the debtor's dependents. It
gives the creditors an unwarranted protection and security. When it
is shown that at the time of the transfer the husband was insolvent,
the transaction is then considered conclusively fraudulent as to credi25

tors.

As indicated above existing creditors are the only ones who have
the right to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. Subsequent creditors
must prove that the conveyance was made with -the intent to defraud
them. Professor Hanna states that the case of Harlanv. Maglaugllin26
established this prevailing American rule.2

7

If, however, the donor

19 Sawyer v. Metters, 133 Wis. 350, 113 N. W. 682 (1907) ; Lavigne v. Tobin,
62 Neb. 686, 72 N. W. 1040 (1897).
20

For an example of circumstances showing no intent to defraud subsequent

creditors, see Todd v. Nelson, 109 N. Y. 316, 16 N. E. 360 (1888).
21 Garner v. St. Banking Co., 150 Ga. 6, 102 S. E. 442 (1920); Annotation,
17 L. R. A. 728.
22 Matson v. Melchor, 42 Mich. 477, 4 N. W. 200 (1880).
23 Tanner v. Frink, 103 Neb. 817, 174 N. W. 417 (1919).
24 Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. 481 (1818). Changed in N. Y. by Sec-

tion 265 of the Real Property Law, and Section 37 of the Personal Property Law.
But see Severs v. Dodson, 53 N. J. Eq. 633, 34 Ati. 7 (1895).
25 Tobias v. Adams, 201 Cal. 689, 258 Pac. 588 (1927); Roberts, Johnson,
and Rand v. Baker, 224 Ky. 414, 6 S. W. (2d) 474 (1928).
26 90 Pa. 293 (1879).
27 Hanna, Cases on Creditor's Rights, 130.
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retains possession of the gift and secures credit on the strength of
such possession either existing or subsequent creditors may set the gift
28
aside.
Upon an inquiry at the instance of creditors into a transaction between husband and wife the general rule requiring the utmost good
faith between parties in confidential relations will be applied. Thus
a wife claiming under a transfer from her husband as against other
29
creditors has the burden of showing the validity of the transaction.
Nor does the fact that she is in possession relieve her of this burden. 0
In Dalley's Assigned Estate"l the court said: "Fraudulent collusion
between husband and wife is so easy of execution and so difficult of
proof that it is the well-settled rule that a wife claiming as a creditor
against other creditors of the husband must prove her claim by evidence clear and satisfactory to a degree beyond that required of other
creditors, and leave no doubt of its good faith and its truth in fact."
Any phase of the law of debtor and creditor is naturally subject to
the fluctuations of political fortune. Election contests are often but
clashes between the opposing interests of debtor and creditor. Political ascendency is reflected in the decisions of courts and prevailing
public opinion influences the logic of judges. Conflicting decisions on
this subject in the United States can also be explained by the economic
status of the various states. The so-called "debtor" states, largely
agrarian in population, favor the debtor; and the "creditor" states
just as naturally favor the creditor. But, while these facts operate
upon the development of the law, its present state as it pertains to
fraudulent transfers from husband to wife is generally harmonious and
fundamentally equitable. No court will countenance any actual fraud
or unjust enrichment. All the rules mentioned previously have these
considerations as their basis. These rules are sometimes difficult to
enforce because men who consider themselves strictly honest are often
able to convince themselves that certain transfers are not fraudulent
although they actually are. The law cannot hope to control the consciences of men; it can only set standards.
Thos. L. McKevitt.
28 Karst v. Kane, 136 N. Y. 316, 32 N. E. 1073 (1893). See also Wilson v.
Carpenter, 17 Wis. 512 (1863), and Goetz v. Newell, 183 Wis. 559, 198 N. W. 368

(1924), which hold that the donor must part not only with the possession, but
with dominion over the property.
29 27 C. J. Fraudulent Conveyances, p. 792, Note 61; contra: State Bank of
Winsted v. Strandberg, 180 N. W. 1006 (Minn. 1921); Crenshaw v. Halvorsen, 183
Iowa 148, 165 N. W. 360 (1917).
30 Stevens v. Corson, 30 Neb. 544, 46 N. W. 655 (1890).

31

200 Pa. 140, 49 Atl. 755 (1901).

NOTES
RECEIVERSHIPS IN MORTGAGES.-The practice of appointing a receiver in mortgage foreclosure proceedings originated at an early date
in the English Court of Chancery and all the leading principles which
first governed it were well settled in England long before the American
Revolution. In recent years there has been a rapid development of
the law of receiverships and, both by judicial decisions and statutory
enactments, the scope of the practice has been broadened and extended
so as to adapt equitable principles to the requirements of commercial
advancement. The purpose in naming a receiver is not regarded as
an end in itself, but only as a means to better secure a necessary and
ultimate end.
A receiver is a person appointed by a court to take into his custody,
control and management the property or funds of another pending
judicial action concerning them. Apart from statutes, a receiver is a
person appointed by the court to preserve the property in question
only pendente lite.' He is supposed to be an indifferent person as between the parties to the cause, whose function or office it is to receive
and preserve the property or fund in litigation pendente lite, when it
is made apparent to the court that the rights of the parties concerned
2
require such protection.
A receiver may be appointed in, and only in, a pending cause,3
and a receiver will not be appointed where there is another safe, expedient, adequate, and less drastic remedy at law or in equity.4 Generally, the mortgage debt must be already due and there must be such
default as to entitle the mortgagee to commence an action to foreclose
the mortgage and the bill must be actually filed before a receiver can
be appointed. 5 A receiver may be appointed, however, before the
entry of the deficiency decree. 6 Despite the general requirements, in
1 Meyers et al. v. Occidental Oil Company, 288 Fed. 997 (1923).
2 Gaither v. Stockbridge, 67 Md. 222, 10 AtI. 309 (1887).
3 "Where notice in an action has been served, defendant has appeared and

the parties are before the court, an action is pending so as to authorize the court
to appoint a receiver, though defendant's appearance may have been special or
the notice or service may have been defective. An erroneous order appointing
a receiver is not cause of reversal, if followed by a second and proper order, and
no harm is shown to have resulted." Hellebush v. Blake, 119 Ind. 349, 21 N. E.
976 (1889), Syl. § 2.
4 Jacob Schack v. Edward B. McKey, 97 Ill. App. 460 (1901).
5 "Where a mortgage to secure several notes contemporaneously executed
provides that all the notes shall become due on default in the payment of any
of them, on such default the mortgagee may proceed to foreclose for the notes
due by their tenor, or may declare them all due, and foreclose for the entire debt
pursuant to the terms of the mortgage, but he cannot have a receiver appointed
to take charge of the mortgaged premises and collect rents pending the maturity
of all the notes, and then have foreclosure." Phillips v. Taylor, 96 Ala. 426, 11
So. 323 (1892), Syl. § 1.
6

Helen J. Bolton v. Starr, 223 Ill. App. 39 (1921).
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cases where waste, destruction or inextricable confusion may result
without prompt action of the court, the court will make the appointment at any stage of the suit the facts require it. 7 Sometimes a receiver may be appointed before defendant is affected with notice of
the pendency of the suit, upon a proper case of urgent necessity made
in the original or a distinct petition and supported by evidential facts.8
A further and more distinct explanation shows that a receiver may be
properly appointed without notice, and before giving the adverse party
an opportunity to be heard, in, and only in, an extreme and exceptional
case, in which there is a great emergency and an imperious and most
stringent necessity for an immediate appointment, as where the adverse party is out of the jurisdiction of the court and cannot be found
and served with notice.9 According to some authorities, even where
there is an emergency, a temporary receiver should be appointed only
until a day fixed for a hearing on the trial to show cause. 10
The grounds upon which a receiver may be appointed are intrinsically composed of any unreasonable misuse of the property which
would necessitate protection for the mortgagee against total loss of
his investment. While the remedy of receivership will not be granted
except upon equitable grounds and for substantial reason, where it
appears to the court that the equitable rights of the parties can be
fully protected by the appointment of a receiver and considerable
loss or damage may otherwise be occasioned to the mortgagee, a receivership is justifiable." The right of the complainant as mortgagee
to the appointment of a receiver pending a suit for-foreclosure rests
upon the general principle that the appointment is necessary for the
preservation of the property and its appropriation to pay their mortgage debt. 12 Chief among the grounds for appointing a receiver, are,
Columbia Finance Co. v. Morgan et al., 45 S. W. 65 (Ky. App. 1898).
8 "There is no lack of power to appoint a receiver in a law action; and
that, too, before the -defendant is affected with notice of the pendency of the suit,
upon a proper case made in the original or a distinct petition, and supported by
evidential facts." Jones v. Graves, 20 Ia. 596 (1866), Syl. § 2.
7

9 Edward H. Cooper v. El Louise Schoeberlein, 247 Ill.App. 170 (1928).
St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Weir, 135 Mo. 230, 36 S. W. 357 (1896).
10

11 Broad, etc., Nat. Bank v. Larsen, 88 N. J. Eq. 245, 102 AtI. 265 (1917);
Meyer v. Thomas, 30 So. 89 (Ala. 1901).
12

"An appeal will lie to the supreme court from a decree rendered by the

chancellor on appeal to him revoking and annulling the order of the register by
appointing a receiver without notice. The right of a mortgagee to the appointment
of a receiver pending a suit for the foreclosure under his mortgage rests upon the
general principle that the appointment is necessary for the preservation of the
mortgaged property and its appropriation to the payment of the mortgage debt.
The appointment of a receiver is a matter of sound judicial discretion when there
is a reasonable probability that the person asking therefor will ultimately succeed
in obtaining the general relief sought for by his suit; and, being based upon the
fact that there is no other adequate remedy or means of accomplishing the desired

NOTES
we find: (1) Abandonment of the property- (2) Disposition of or
interference with the property; (3) Inadequacy of security and insolvency of the debtor; (4) Danger of waste or injury; (5) Pledge
of rents and profits; (6) Provisions for receivership in mortgage; (7)
Failure to pay taxes or insure; (8) Lack of right or capacity to care
for property; and (9) Fraud.
Abandonment may be sufficient ground to require the appointment
of a receiver for its protection and care.' 3
Disposition or interference with the property, under proper circumstances, will allow equity to make such restraining orders as may be
necessary to prevent such acts, and to accomplish such purpose it may
-appoint a receiver. Also, equity may compel the surrender of the possession of mortgaged property, pending the litigation, to prevent its
being carried out of the jurisdiction or being converted.' 4
Inadequacy of security and insolvency of the debtor may justify
the receivership especially where other equitable grounds exist.' 5 In
one case it was held so where the rents had been appropriated by the
mortgagor to his own use and he had not paid taxes or overdue interest, so as to depreciate the security. Whether the inadequacy of
the security has been caused by the wrongful act of the mortgagor or
not is immaterial. 16
Some cases have held that it is sufficient to show that the mortgaged property is probably insufficient to satisfy the mortgage debt
or of doubtful or uncertain sufficiency.17 Each case must rest upon
its own facts, and the question is whether it appears to the court that
the equitable rights of the parties can be protected only by such appointment.'3 Mere possibility of future insufficiency however has
been held insufficient grounds for appointment,' 9 although it may be
justified without showing the actual insolvency of the mortgage debtor,
objects of the judicial proceedings, must be exercised in view of the circumstances
of the particular case, for the purpose of promoting the ends of justice and of
protecting the rights of all the parties interested in the controversy and the subject
matter." Meyer v. Thomas, op. cit. supra note 11, Syl., p. 265, § 2.
Collins v. Gross, 51 Wash. 516, 99 Pac. 573 (1909).
Meridian Oil Co. v. Randolph, 26 Okla. 634, 110 Pac. 722 (1910).
15 Donnelly v. Butts, 137 Minn. 1, 162 N. W. 674 (1917).
16 Land Title & Trust Co. v. Kellogg, 73 N. J. Eq. 524, 68 At]. 80 (1907).
13
14

17

(1901).
Is
(1917).
19
solvent
to pay
closure

Philadelphia Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Oyler, 61 Neb. 702, 85 N. W. 899
Broad & Market Nat'l. Bank v. Larson, 88 N. J. Eq. 245, 102 Ati. 265
"A receiver will not be appointed on foreclosure when the debtor is inmerely because the property at some future time may become insufficient
the mortgage debt. Ordinarily a receiver will not be appointed in. a foresuit when the mortgaged property is the homestead of the mortgagor."

Laune v. Hauser, 58 Neb. 663, 79 N. W. 555 (1899), Syl. § 1.
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the inadequacy of the security being sufficient to justify it.20 It has
been held that, where the security is inadequate and the mortgage
debtor is insolvent, a receiver may be appointed although there is an
21
indorser or grantor of the debt who is solvent or responsible.
Danger of waste or injury may be sufficient grounds for the appointment of a receiver where it is shown that the property, if allowed
to remain in the possession of the mortgagor, is in imminent danger of
being wasted, depreciated, or materially injured. 22 But an act of waste
does not always justify the appointment of a receiver; it is necessary
to show that the injury will so depreciate the value of the property
that it will not thereafter afford adequate security. 23 It has been held
that the fact that the property has decreased in commercial value is
no cause for the appointment of a receiver, where this is incident to
a general depreciation of farming property, nor that the mortgagor has
24
failed to pay the interest, when this is due to a failure of the crops.
It has also been held that mere disuse of a manufacturing plant
under an agreement with other manufacturers to restrict production,
although attended with the decay and dilapidation inseparable from
disuse is not such destruction or waste as to entitle the mortgagee to a
receiver pending foreclosure. 25 However, the mortgagee cannot have
a receiver where he himself has taken possession of the property and
is running it and receiving the rents and income. 26 It is not the policy
of courts of equity to take charge of real estate and manage and control it through the aid of a receiver as against the party in possession
asserting title in himself, unless it is shown to be in imminent danger
of great waste or irreparable injury. In realty, the substance of the
litigation is not capable of destruction or removal, and hence the
27
necessity for a receiver can seldom be so urgent as in other cases.
When rents and profits are pledged for the payment of a debt,
together with the land itself they constitute a fund primarily liable
0
21

Schultz v. Stiner, 97 Kan. 555, 155 Pac. 1073 (1916).

"In an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage, where the property
pledged is insufficient to pay the debt, and the party primarily liable therefor is
insolvent, the trial court is authorized, on an application by the mortgagee, to
appoint a receiver for the mortgaged property; and in such case it is immaterial
that a person who is solvent is liable for the debt, as indorser or guarantor."
Buck v. Stuhen, 63 Neb. 273, 88 N. W. 483 (1901), Syl. § 1.

22 "A receiver may be appointed if the facts justify it, at any time while
a suit is pending, and after appeal to the supreme court from a final judgment
the suit is still pending, so that the lower court may, on application, make such
appointment." Brinkman et al. v. Ritzinger, 82 Ind. 358 (1882), Syl. § 1.
23 Justus v. Fagerstrom, 141 Minn. 323, 170 N. W. 201 (1918).

Homer v. Dey, 61 N. J. Eq. 554, 49 Atl. 154 (1901).
25 Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Union Mills Plaster Co., 37 Fed. 286, 3
L. R. A. 90 (1889).
26
Sleeper and others v. J. H. Iselin & Co., 59 Ia. 379, 13 N. W. 341 (1882).
24

27 Kelley v. Steel, 9 Ida. 141, 72 Pac. 887 (1903).
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for the debt, and in this case a receiver may be appointed, on the application of the mortgagee without showing that the land is inadequate
as security and without question of the mortgagor's solvency. 28 But
still, even here, the appointment of a receiver is not a matter of course
and the court may exercise its discretion as in other cases and refuse
the appointment if there appears to be no reason for granting it, as
where it appears that the premises are adequate security for the mortgage debt or where it affirmatively appears that the rents and profits
were not pledged. 29 A court of equity has power to appoint a receiver
and grant equitable relief where there are no express words in the
mortgage giving a lien upon rents and profits on the property, but
such action may not be taken unless there are proper grounds therefor.
However, under the theory that a mortgagee has no lien on the rents
of, and profits from, the mortgaged premises where such rents and
profits are not pledged by the mortgage, it has been held that the
inadequacy of the security or the insolvency of the mortgage debtor,
or both are not per se grounds for the appointment of a receiver to
collect the rents and profits, especially where such rents and profits
have already been assigned by the mortgagor.3 0
Provisions for receivership in the mortgage, such as a stipulation
that the mortgagee shall be entitled to have a receiver appointed upon
default and the commencement of foreclosure proceedings, shall be
ample justification for such appointment, if not as a matter of course,
still upon any showing of equitable grounds therefor, or if no good
reason against the appointment is shown. 31 If the statute law so restricts the power of appointments that such appointment would not
be proper in the particular case, jurisdiction to make the appointment
cannot be conferred by stipulation in the mortgage. 32 If the stipulation
is valid, it is binding on a purchaser of the premises, and is not revoked
by the death of the mortgagor. Also, if the stipulation is otherwise
Ball v. Marske, 202 Ill. 31, 66 N. E. 845 (1903).
Winans v. Smith, 199 Ia. 715, 202 N. W. 745 (1925).
30 Best v. Schermier, 6 N. J. Eq. 154 (1847).
31 "The action of the court in appointing a receiver on the application of the
grantee in a deed of trust, pending foreclosure, where the deed pledges the rents
and profits, and authorizes the appointment of a receiver in case of default, and
where the grantor failed to observe his agreement to keep the building, in which
the property chiefly consisted, insured, and suffered interest due and unpaid to
accumulate, is not erroneous, especially where the grantor is permitted to retain
possession of the homestead and other parts of the premises to be rented for his
support.
"A receiver appointed pending an action of foreclosure of a deed of trust containing a stipulation for the appointment of a receiver 'during the pendency of
the suit' is properly permitted to continue in possession after the decree of foreclosure, and before the sale of the premises." Bagley v. Illinois Trust & Savings
Bank, 199 Ill. 76, 64 N. E. 1085 (1902), Syl. §§ 1, 2.
32 Couper v. Shirley, 75 Fed. 168 (1896).
28

29
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valid, it is enforceable regardless of the insolvency of the mortgagor. 3 3
A receivership clause in a mortgage does not prima facie, or as a matter of right, entitle the mortgagee to the appointment of a receiver,
34
It
the question still remaining within the discretion of the court.
will not appoint him where reasonable ground therefor is not shown
and the appointment should not be made where there is no danger of
ultimate loss of the property or waste thereof or where the property
appears to furnish ample security. 3 5
Failure to pay taxes or insure may or may not warrant the appointment of a receiver, depending upon whether such fact destroys
or impairs the value of the security. 30 It has been held that the delinquency in the payment of taxes is no ground for the appointment
of a receiver where the mortgagor is not shown to be insolvent. 3 7 On
the ground that the mortgagee may both insure and pay taxes due
upon the property, it has been held that the failure of the mortgagor
to insure the property or his failure both to insure the property and
38
pay the taxes does not alone justify the appointment of a receiver.
Where a party in possession of a mortgaged property is not required
to insure same for benefit of the mortgagee, a receivership is not
justifiable. 30
Lack of right or capacity to care for the property may furnish
grounds for appointing a receiver when there is no person having a
Stevens v. Pearson, 202 Ill. App. 22 (1916).
"Ordinarily, before a receiver will be appointed pendente lite on the application of a mortgagee, he must show that the mortgaged premises are insufficient to secure his debt and that the mortgagor, or maker of the note, is insolvent.
"The beneficial title to mortgaged property is in the mortgagor, and provisions
therein for the sequestration of the rents and profits of the mortgaged premises
are not of controlling force." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Broeker et al., 166 Ind. 576,
77 N. E. 1092 (1906), Syl. §§ 1, 2.
35 Gilbert v. Berry, 190 Ia. 351, 180 N. W. 197 (1920).
36 "The appointment of a receiver in a bill to foreclose a second mortgage
was fully justified where taxes remained unpaid beyond the time covenanted for
their payment, and there were several unpaid special assessments and one special
assessment had been forfeited for nonpayment, and where the charges as to such
default contained in complainant's affidavit were not denied in defendant's affidavit, but only in the answer which was not under oath." Sarah Althausen v.
Sarah Kohn, 222 Ill. App. 324 (1921), Syl. § 1.
37 Lick v. Strohm, 134 Wash. 490, 236 Pac. 88 (1925).
38 "Since a mortgagee in a mortgage stipulating that the mortgagor shall keep
the property insured for the benefit of the mortgagee, and pay taxes, or, in a
mortgage silent on the subject, may insure the property and pay the taxes and
charge the cost thereof as a part of the original claim, the failure of the mortgagor to insure the property and pay the taxes does not alone justify the appointment of a receiver." Ferguson v. Dickinson, 138 S. W. 221 (Tex. Civ. App.
1911), Syl. § 2. For other cases, see: Mortgages, Cent. Dig., §§ 243, 1374, 1375;
Dec. Dig., §§ 124, 468.
39 Ferguson v. Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 38.
33
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